Advisory Board

  • Cai Hongbin
  • Peking University Guanghua School of Management
  • Peter Clarke
  • Barry Diller
  • IAC/InterActiveCorp
  • Fu Chengyu
  • China National Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec Group)
  • Richard J. Gnodde
  • Goldman Sachs International
  • Lodewijk Hijmans van den Bergh
  • De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek N.V.
  • Jiang Jianqing
  • Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Ltd. (ICBC)
  • Handel Lee
  • King & Wood Mallesons
  • Richard Li
  • PCCW Limited
  • Pacific Century Group
  • Liew Mun Leong
  • Changi Airport Group
  • Martin Lipton
  • New York University
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
  • Liu Mingkang
  • China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)
  • Dinesh C. Paliwal
  • Harman International Industries
  • Leon Pasternak
  • BCC Partners
  • Tim Payne
  • Brunswick Group
  • Joseph R. Perella
  • Perella Weinberg Partners
  • Baron David de Rothschild
  • N M Rothschild & Sons Limited
  • Dilhan Pillay Sandrasegara
  • Temasek International Pte. Ltd.
  • Shao Ning
  • State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council of China (SASAC)
  • John W. Snow
  • Cerberus Capital Management, L.P.
  • Former U.S. Secretary of Treasury
  • Bharat Vasani
  • Tata Group
  • Wang Junfeng
  • King & Wood Mallesons
  • Wang Kejin
  • China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)
  • Wei Jiafu
  • Kazakhstan Potash Corporation Limited
  • Yang Chao
  • China Life Insurance Co. Ltd.
  • Zhu Min
  • International Monetary Fund

Legal Roundtable

  • Dimitry Afanasiev
  • Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev and Partners (Moscow)
  • William T. Allen
  • NYU Stern School of Business
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (New York)
  • Johan Aalto
  • Hannes Snellman Attorneys Ltd (Finland)
  • Nigel P. G. Boardman
  • Slaughter and May (London)
  • Willem J.L. Calkoen
  • NautaDutilh N.V. (Rotterdam)
  • Peter Callens
  • Loyens & Loeff (Brussels)
  • Bertrand Cardi
  • Darrois Villey Maillot & Brochier (Paris)
  • Santiago Carregal
  • Marval, O’Farrell & Mairal (Buenos Aires)
  • Martín Carrizosa
  • Philippi Prietocarrizosa & Uría (Bogotá)
  • Carlos G. Cordero G.
  • Aleman, Cordero, Galindo & Lee (Panama)
  • Ewen Crouch
  • Allens (Sydney)
  • Adam O. Emmerich
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (New York)
  • Rachel Eng
  • WongPartnership (Singapore)
  • Sergio Erede
  • BonelliErede (Milan)
  • Kenichi Fujinawa
  • Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu (Tokyo)
  • Manuel Galicia Romero
  • Galicia Abogados (Mexico City)
  • Danny Gilbert
  • Gilbert + Tobin (Sydney)
  • Vladimíra Glatzová
  • Glatzová & Co. (Prague)
  • Juan Miguel Goenechea
  • Uría Menéndez (Madrid)
  • Andrey A. Goltsblat
  • Goltsblat BLP (Moscow)
  • Juan Francisco Gutiérrez I.
  • Philippi Prietocarrizosa & Uría (Santiago)
  • Fang He
  • Jun He Law Offices (Beijing)
  • Christian Herbst
  • Schönherr (Vienna)
  • Lodewijk Hijmans van den Bergh
  • De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek N.V. (Amsterdam)
  • Hein Hooghoudt
  • NautaDutilh N.V. (Amsterdam)
  • Sameer Huda
  • Hadef & Partners (Dubai)
  • Masakazu Iwakura
  • TMI Associates (Tokyo)
  • Christof Jäckle
  • Hengeler Mueller (Frankfurt)
  • Michael Mervyn Katz
  • Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs (Johannesburg)
  • Handel Lee
  • King & Wood Mallesons (Beijing)
  • Martin Lipton
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (New York)
  • Alain Maillot
  • Darrois Villey Maillot Brochier (Paris)
  • Antônio Corrêa Meyer
  • Machado, Meyer, Sendacz e Opice (São Paulo)
  • Sergio Michelsen Jaramillo
  • Brigard & Urrutia (Bogotá)
  • Zia Mody
  • AZB & Partners (Mumbai)
  • Christopher Murray
  • Osler (Toronto)
  • Francisco Antunes Maciel Müssnich
  • Barbosa, Müssnich & Aragão (Rio de Janeiro)
  • I. Berl Nadler
  • Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP (Toronto)
  • Umberto Nicodano
  • BonelliErede (Milan)
  • Brian O'Gorman
  • Arthur Cox (Dublin)
  • Robin Panovka
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (New York)
  • Sang-Yeol Park
  • Park & Partners (Seoul)
  • José Antonio Payet Puccio
  • Payet Rey Cauvi (Lima)
  • Kees Peijster
  • COFRA Holding AG (Zug)
  • Juan Martín Perrotto
  • Uría & Menéndez (Madrid/Beijing)
  • Philip Podzebenko
  • Herbert Smith Freehills (Sydney)
  • Geert Potjewijd
  • De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek (Amsterdam/Beijing)
  • Qi Adam Li
  • Jun He Law Offices (Shanghai)
  • Biörn Riese
  • Jurie Advokat AB (Sweden)
  • Mark Rigotti
  • Herbert Smith Freehills (Sydney)
  • Rafael Robles Miaja
  • Robles Miaja (Mexico City)
  • Alberto Saravalle
  • BonelliErede (Milan)
  • Maximilian Schiessl
  • Hengeler Mueller (Düsseldorf)
  • Cyril S. Shroff
  • Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas (Mumbai)
  • Shardul S. Shroff
  • Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas & Co.(New Delhi)
  • Klaus Søgaard
  • Gorrissen Federspiel (Denmark)
  • Ezekiel Solomon
  • Allens (Sydney)
  • Emanuel P. Strehle
  • Hengeler Mueller (Munich)
  • David E. Tadmor
  • Tadmor & Co. (Tel Aviv)
  • Kevin J. Thomson
  • Barrick Gold Corporation (Toronto)
  • Yu Wakae
  • Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu (Tokyo)
  • Wang Junfeng
  • King & Wood Mallesons (Beijing)
  • Tomasz Wardynski
  • Wardynski & Partners (Warsaw)
  • Xiao Wei
  • Jun He Law Offices (Beijing)
  • Xu Ping
  • King & Wood Mallesons (Beijing)
  • Shuji Yanase
  • OK Corporation (Tokyo)
  • Alvin Yeo
  • WongPartnership LLP (Singapore)

Founding Directors

  • William T. Allen
  • NYU Stern School of Business
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
  • Nigel P.G. Boardman
  • Slaughter and May
  • Cai Hongbin
  • Peking University Guanghua School of Management
  • Adam O. Emmerich
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
  • Robin Panovka
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
  • Peter Williamson
  • Cambridge Judge Business School
  • Franny Yao
  • Ernst & Young

Monthly Archives: June 2018

CHINESE UPDATE – The Future of Automotive JVs under the New Policy of Opening Up the Automotive Industry in China

Contributed by: Adam Li (Li Qi), Jun He Law Offices (Shanghai)

Editors’ Note: Contributed by Adam Li, a partner at JunHe and a member of XBMA’s Legal Roundtable. Mr. Li is a leading expert in international mergers & acquisitions, capital markets and international financial transactions involving Chinese companies. This article was authored by Mr. Michael Weng, and Mr. Daniel He, both partners at JunHe. Mr. Weng has broad experience dealing with complicated foreign direct investment and cross-border M&A transactions, and Mr. He is specialized in merger and acquisition projects, joint venture transactions, and strategic investment projects in various industries.


There are numerous examples of Automotive JVs that have been operating successfully and profitably in China for more than a decade. With the imminent removal of the shareholding cap on foreign investment in automotive manufacturing, there will be opportunities for Chinese and foreign parties to alter their equity holdings, including being able to buy out the JV partner or exit in part or completely. It is our assessment that Chinese and foreign parties are unlikely to immediately implement any major changes. Rather, we expect them to maintain the status quo for a considerable period of time, until larger commercial incentives trigger a withdrawal of one of the joint venture partners.


Main Article

At the recent Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2018, the Chinese President Mr. Xi Jinping announced that “China will remain unchanged in its adherence to reforming and opening up, and will continue to launch new major measures to pursue further opening up.”  Since then, both the National Development and Reform Commission (“NDRC”) and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology in their respective Answers to Reporters’ Questions have committed to gradually opening up automotive manufacturing to foreign investment before 2022 by removing the shareholding limit for foreign investors and also the restriction on foreign investors being allowed to invest in no more than two automotive joint ventures. The reforms and their implications for the future are of great relevance to the many long-standing, active Sino-foreign automotive joint ventures (“Automotive JVs”). In this article, we will discuss several possible development paths for Automotive JVs, and some of the issues arising from the reforms.


I.       Possible Development Paths for Automotive JVs


1.   Chinese Partner Acquires All or Part of the Equity Held by Foreign Investor

Thanks to the massive growth in demand in the Chinese automotive market, many of the Automotive JVs have been highly profitable. The Chinese partners of those Automotive JVs have primarily been very large central or local state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) with solid foundations and extensive connections, enabling them to make a vital contribution to Automotive JVs’ swift localization and expansion within the Chinese market. It may be that these Chinese partners will hope to acquire the equity interest held by their Automotive JV foreign partners in order to further strengthen their control within the Automotive JV and to improve their profit earnings. However, Automotive JVs are still largely reliant upon their foreign partners for business resources including branding, new ideas, technology and equipment, and the auto groups to which the foreign partners belong are unlikely to willingly give up the substantial revenue and profits generated by the Automotive JVs. Hence, it will likely prove difficult, at least in the short run, for the Chinese partners of any successful Automotive JV to disrupt the structural balance by acquiring all or part of their foreign partner’s equity.

However, for an Automotive JV that is struggling and not profitable, it is possible that the Chinese partner may be able to acquire their foreign partner’s equity. Indeed, it may well be that a foreign partner in such unsuccessful Automotive JV has already been contemplating an exit. The gradual removal of restrictions on foreign investment in automotive manufacturing presents the opportunity for foreign partners to leave an unsuccessful Automotive JV and set up their own entity. However, before making such a decision, a foreign partner should first make a full assessment of its ability to operate the business independently.  Success in the Chinese market requires not only branding, technology and management expertise, but also access to and control of sales channels and an in-depth understanding of local consumers and markets.


2.  Foreign Partner Acquires All or Part of the Equity Held by Chinese Partner

Removing the shareholding cap of foreign investments in automotive manufacturing has eliminated the legal barrier preventing foreign partners from acquiring the equity held by their Chinese partners, but is of course dependent upon the willingness of both sides to pursue this option. It seems highly unlikely that a Chinese partner would be inclined to relinquish its equity interest in a profitable Automotive JV. Moreover, from a strategic perspective, a Chinese partner aiming to build up its own brands may use the leverage of its involvement in an Automotive JV, which brings with it indirect support in the expansion and influence of the Chinese partner’s own independent brands, by having access to the Automotive JV’s upgraded products and technologies, and skills development. In addition, with only very limited licenses to manufacture traditional fuel vehicles, it is highly unlikely that any newly established automotive manufacturer would be able to attain the necessary regulatory approval. Ultimately, the Chinese partner is highly unlikely to hand over control of the Automotive JV with the required manufacturing license. For an under-performing Automotive JV, while the acquisition of a Chinese partner’s equity may not bring immediate financial benefits, the foreign partner could use the existing manufacturing approval, production lines and personnel to start production right away. Provided the acquisition price of the Chinese partner’s equity is reasonable, this could be an effective shortcut for a foreign brand seeking to obtain production capacity and operate independently.


3.  Maintain the Status Quo

After the NDRC released its information on easing restrictions on foreign investment in automotive manufacturing, some of the foreign partners of existing Automotive JVs were quick to confirm their intention to continue to support the development of their respective current joint ventures in China. It is our assessment that both the Chinese and foreign parties should take a pragmatic approach to the new policy and, at least in the short-term, focus on maintaining the current structure. It seems unlikely — at least until the expiry of the operation term of the existing joint venture contract — that the Chinese and foreign parties of most of Automotive JVs automakers will initiate a change in the balance of ownership by seeking to acquire all or part of the equity held by their partner.


II.      Key Factors Influencing the Possible Development Path

Once the shareholding limits for foreign investors in automotive manufacturing have been phased out, a variety of factors will determine whether foreign automakers choose to remain with their Chinese partners or to make their own way. Some of the key factors for consideration are listed below.


1.  Continuing Product Upgrade

At present, many of the Automotive JVs’ products are based upon foreign brands’ original overseas car models. The production of core components, such as vehicle engines and gearboxes, is primarily based upon foreign partner’s technology. Therefore, the prosperity of the Chinese automobile market driven by the Automotive JVs is essentially attributable to foreign automakers’ products. The continuing survival and success of Automotive JVs is at least in part dependent upon foreign partners providing access to upgraded products and technologies. The growing sophistication of Chinese consumers and the emergence of local automotive brands builders means that Automotive JVs are facing an ever more demanding and competitive market. Only those Automotive JVs that continuously innovate will survive. The removal of the shareholder cap means that a foreign automaker with strong product R&D and upgrade capabilities and whose Chinese partners lack product input capabilities may be able to use their relative strength to persuade their Chinese partner to transfer some of their equity. If a foreign automaker is able to obtain continuing regulatory approval to manufacture on their own (as mentioned above, the possibility of obtaining new licenses is very slim), it may be possible for the foreign automaker to set aside the existing Automotive JV in order to establish a separate company, manufacturing and selling their own automobiles in a wholly-owned company.


2.  The Trend toward New Energy Vehicles

The growth in purchases of traditional fuel vehicles has slowed down in recent years. In the meantime, sales of new energy vehicles are increasing, attributable at least to some extent to Chinese government efforts to promote these upgraded, clean energy automobiles. Nowadays the vast majority of Automotive JVs’ production is traditional fuel vehicles. However, this is likely to change, with declined growth in demand for fuel vehicles, the implementation of government policy incentives for new energy vehicles, and preemptive dominance of the new energy car market by the Chinese traditional and new automakers. Given that the first shareholding cap to be eliminated will be on new energy car manufacturers, in 2018, foreign automakers will need to decide how they intend to manufacture new energy vehicles in China, whether by taking advantage of a current Automotive JV to apply for cross-category production of new energy vehicles, or by establishing a new wholly-owned subsidiary to undertake this task. The Measures for the Parallel Administration of the Average Fuel Consumption and New Energy Vehicle Points of Passenger Vehicle Enterprises (“Points Administration Policy”) that have been implemented since April 1, 2018, require foreign automakers to take into account the impact on the production of fuel vehicles by the existing JV automaker in their overall production plans. Starting from 2019, according to the Points Administration Policy, there will be a points system under which Automotive JVs will be subject to production limits for fuel vehicles. When this limit is reached, they will be required to produce a certain proportion of new energy vehicles in order to be permitted to continue the production of fuel vehicles. Points will be accrued for the manufacture of new energy vehicles by Automotive JVs and additionally will be available for purchase, through an official platform, from third parties with surplus points. As it stands, the simplest way for foreign automakers to satisfy the new energy vehicle points requirements and to continue production of fuel vehicles is to maintain their current Automotive JV, while introducing new energy vehicle models.


Influences of the Tariff Cut

On May 22, 2018, the Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council issued an announcement stating that, effective from July 1, 2018, there will be a reduction of tariffs on imported vehicles and car parts. Tariff rates on vehicles will be reduced from their current levels of 20% and 25%, down to 15%. Even after the adjustment, tariffs will remain higher than in developed countries such as Europe, the United States and Japan. Moreover, the final price of imported cars will also be subject to VAT, consumption tax, dealer profits, and other factors. While the tariff cuts may initially have a short-term stimulating effect on sales of imported vehicles, their impact is not forecasted to be significant in the long run. In an environment where foreign investment restrictions are gradually being lifted, foreign automakers seeking to become more competitive will need to take into consideration the relative costs and factors – economic and non-economic – of establishing or acquiring a wholly-owned local automaker compared with the option of exporting vehicles to China under a lower tariff regime.


3.  Difficulties in Going Solo

One of the Chinese government’s original intentions in formulating the automotive joint venture policy was a “market-for-technology” strategy. In return for providing their technology, foreign automakers have gained Chinese market share through their partnerships with China’s central and local SOEs and large-scale private enterprises. In addition, the foreign automakers have obtained special support and benefits in aspects such as regulatory approvals, land acquisition and factory construction, fiscal subsidy and tax preferential treatment, and so on, without which their foreign automotive products might not even have been brought into China. If, after removal of the foreign shareholding cap, a foreign automaker chooses to operate completely independently and without the support of Chinese partners, there is no certainty that they will continue to enjoy such special benefits. Specifically, approvals for new energy vehicle manufacturing are currently on hold and there are unlikely to be many more licenses issued to manufacture traditional fuel vehicles. While it is anticipated that the approval process for new energy vehicles will recommence soon, it seems likely that entry thresholds will rise substantially. Against this background, it may be unwise for foreign automakers to abandon their current joint ventures and start over on their own. Building an automobile sales and after-sales network is a costly and time-consuming process, further complicated by the range of differing local business environments around China. Without Chinese partners to help navigate local markets, foreign automakers will likely face barriers to a quick set-up and roll out of sales and after-sales networks, particularly on dealing with the existing dealers of the JV Automakers and balancing their relationships and interests.


*     *     *     *     *


In the decades since Automotive JVs were first established, there have been numerous reforms to the legal environment as well as changes in the range of products offered, fluctuating market conditions, the introduction of new domestic brands, increases in labor and other production costs, a shifting international business environment, and the emergence of new energy cars. As is so often the case in China, the only constant is change itself.


The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and have not been endorsed, confirmed, or approved by XBMA or any of the editors of XBMA Forum, nor by XBMA’s founders, members, contributors, academic partners, advisory board members, or others. No inference to the contrary should be drawn.


Board Ready: Shareholder Activism, Corporate Governance and the Hunt for Long-Term Value

Editor’s Note: This article was authored by Sabastian V. Niles of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.


Board Ready: Shareholder Activism, Corporate Governance and
the Hunt for Long-Term Value

* A modified version of this article was recently featured in a publication for public company directors, CEOs and general counsels.

As the spotlight on boards, management teams, corporate performance and governance intensifies, as articles like the Bloomberg and Fortune profiles of Elliott Management (“The World’s Most Feared Investor—Why the World’s CEOs Fear Paul Singer” and “Whatever It Takes to Win—How Paul Singer’s Hedge Fund Always Wins”) and other activist investors become required reading in every boardroom and C-suite, and as activist campaigns against successful companies of all sizes increase worldwide, below are fifteen themes expected to impact boardroom, CEO and investor behavior and decision-making in the coming years.

  1. The CEO, the Board and the Strategy.
  2. Activism Preparedness Grows Up.
  3. Companies Standing Up, Playing Offense and Showing Conviction without Capitulation. 
  4. Activists Standing Down. 
  5. “Shock, Awe & Ambush” Meets the Power of Behind the Scenes Persuasion. 
  6. Better Index IR and Not Taking the Passives (or Other Investors) for Granted. 
  7. Quarterly Earnings Rituals.
  8. Embracing the New Paradigm and Long-Termism.
  9. Convergence on ESG and Sustainability. 
  10. Dealing with the Proxy Advisory Firms.
  11. Board Culture, Corporate Culture and Board Quality. 
  12. Capital Allocation. 
  13. Directors as Investor Relation Officers. 
  14. The General Counsel as Investor Relations Officer. 
  15. The Nature of Corporate Governance.

1. The CEO, the Board and the Strategy.

  • The relationship of the CEO with fellow directors will remain the most important, overriding corporate relationship a CEO has.
  • Strengthening that relationship, addressing disconnects openly and directly, and ensuring internal clarity and alignment between the board and management should be prioritized before an activist, takeover threat or crisis emerges.
  • Boards of directors will become more actively involved with management in developing, adjusting and communicating the company’s long-term strategy and operational objectives and anticipating threats to progress.

2. Activism Preparedness Grows Up.

  • Instead of a check-the-box housekeeping exercise, companies will pursue real readiness for activist attacks.
  • Activism preparedness will be integrated into crisis preparedness, strategic planning and board governance.
  • This will include periodic updates for the board by expert advisors working with management; non-generic break glass plans; a philosophy of continuous improvement and rejecting complacency; training, simulations and education informed by live activism experiences; expert review of bylaws and governance guidelines; and cultivating third-party advocates early.
  • Most importantly, deep self-reflection and self-help will identify opportunities for strengthening the company and increasing sustainable value for all stakeholders, mitigating potential vulnerabilities, getting ahead of investor concerns and ensuring that the company’s strategy and governance is well-articulated, updated and understood.
  • The CEO and other directors will be prepared to deal with direct takeover and activist approaches and handle requests by institutional investors and activists to meet directly with management and independent directors.

3. Companies Standing Up, Playing Offense and Showing Conviction without Capitulation. 

  • Well-advised companies will take a less reactive posture to activist attacks, find opportunities to control the narrative, strengthen their positioning and leverage with key investors and stakeholders and understand investor views beyond the activist.
  • Directors and management will maintain their composure and credibility in the face of an activist assault and not get distracted or demoralized.
  • Companies will proactively take action and accelerate previously planned initiatives with wide support to demonstrate responsiveness to investor concerns without acceding to an activists’ more destructive or short-sighted demands.
  • If a legitimate problem is identified, consider whether the company has a different (better) approach than the one proposed by the activist, and if the activist’s idea is a good one, co-opt it.
  • Companies with iconic brands and a track record of established trust will protect – and appropriately leverage – their brands in an activist situation.
  • Negotiating and engaging with an activist from a position of strength rather than fear or weakness will become more common.

4. Activists Standing Down.

  • Through deft handling and prudent advice, more activist situations will be defused and never become public battles, including where the activist concludes they would be better served by moving on to another target.
  • Companies who move quickly to pursue the right initiatives, maintain alignment within the boardroom and engage in the right way with key shareholders and constituencies will achieve beneficial outcomes, gain the confidence of investors beyond the activist and, where dealmaking with an activist is needed, find common ground or obtain favorable settlement terms.

5. “Shock, Awe & Ambush” Meets the Power of Behind the Scenes Persuasion.

  • Until activism evolves, boards and management teams will continue to grapple with activists who mislead, grandstand, goad, work the media, threaten and bully to get their way.
  • But major investors will increasingly reject such irresponsible engagement and more interesting flavors of activism will emerge, led by self-confident and secure funds who value thoughtful, private discussions as to how best to create medium-to-long-term value, respect that boards and management teams may have superior information and expertise and valid reasons for disagreeing with an activist’s solutions, and pursue collaborative, merchant banking approaches intended to assist a company in improving operations and strategies for long-term success without worrying about who gets the credit.
  • In some situations, working with the right kind of activist and showing backbone against misaligned activist funds and investors will deliver superior results.

6. Better Index IR and Not Taking the Passives (or Other Investors) for Granted.

  • BlackRock, State Street and Vanguard will continue to bring their own distinctive brands of stewardship, engagement and patient pressure to bear in the capital markets and at their portfolio companies.
  • Companies will increasingly recognize that a classical “governance roadshow” promoting a check-the-box approach to governance without a two-way dialogue is a missed opportunity to demonstrate to these funds that the company’s strategic choices, board and management priorities and substantive approach to governance deserve support from these investors.
  • More sophisticated and nuanced approaches for gaining and maintaining the confidence of all investors will emerge.
  • Engagement for engagement’s sake will fall out of favor, and targeted, thoughtful and creative approaches will carry the day.

7. Quarterly Earnings Rituals.

  • While quarterly earnings rituals will remain, for now, a fact of life in the U.S., companies and investors will explore alternatives for replacing quarterly rhythms with broader, multi-year frameworks for value creation and publishing new metrics over timeframes that align with business, end market and operational realities. Giving quarterly guidance will fall out of favor and be increasingly criticized.
  • In the U.K. and other jurisdictions that permit flexibility, more companies will move towards non-quarterly cadences for reporting and issuing guidance and seek to attract more long-term oriented investor bases by publishing long-term metrics.
  • In all markets, companies will increasingly discuss near-term results in the context of long-term strategy and objectives, more management time will be spent discussing progress towards important operational and financial goals that will take time to achieve and sell-side analysts will have to adapt to a more long-term oriented landscape or find their services to be in less demand.

8. Embracing the New Paradigm and Long-Termism.

  • The value chain for alignment towards the long-term across public companies, asset managers, asset owners and ultimate beneficiaries (long-term savers and retirees) – each with their own time horizons, goals and incentives – is now recognized as broken.
  • Organizations and initiatives like Focusing Capital on the Long Term, the Coalition for Inclusive Capitalism, the World Economic Forum’s New Paradigm and Roadmap for an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership to Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth, the Conference Board, the Strategic Investor Initiative, the Aspen Institute’s Business & Society Program and Long-Term Strategy Group and others will increasingly collaborate and perhaps consolidate their efforts to ensure lasting change in the market ecosystem occurs.
  • Additional academic and empirical evidence will be published showing the harms to GDP, national productivity and competitiveness, innovation, investor returns, wages and employment from the short-termism in our public markets.
  • Absent evidence that private sector solutions are gaining traction, legislation to promote long-term investment and regulation to mandate long-term oriented stewardship will be pursued worldwide.

9. Convergence on ESG and Sustainability.

  • Companies will increasingly own business-relevant sustainability concerns, integrate relevant corporate social responsibility issues into decision-making and enhance disclosures in appropriate ways, while resisting one-size-fits-all approaches delinked from long-term business imperatives.
  • ESG-ratings services will come under heightened pressure to improve their quality, achieve consistency with peer services, eliminate errors and proactively make corrections or retract reports and ratings.
  • Activist hedge funds will continue to experiment with ESG-themed or socially responsible flavored campaigns to attract additional assets under management, drive a wedge between companies and certain classes of ESG-aligned investors and try to counter their “bad rap” as short-term financial activists who privilege financial engineering and worship the immediate stock price.
  • Mainstream investors will increasingly try to apply and integrate ESG-focused screens and processes into investment models.

10. Dealing with the Proxy Advisory Firms.

  • While proxy advisory firms will increasingly become disintermediated, including through efforts like the U.S. Investor Stewardship Group (ISG) and increased investments by active managers and passive investors in their own governance teams and policies, proxy advisors will retain the power to hijack engagement agendas and drive media narratives.
  • More scrutiny will be brought to bear when advisory firms overreach, where special interests drive a new proxy advisory firm policy and if investors reflexively follow their recommendations.
  • Especially in contested situations, winning the support of the major proxy advisory firms is valuable, but well-advised companies will succeed in convincing investors to deviate from negative recommendations and in special cases persuading advisory firms to reverse recommendations.
  • Negative recommendations will be managed effectively without letting the proxy firm dictate what makes sense for the company.

11. Board Culture, Corporate Culture and Board Quality.

  • Leaders who promote a board culture of constructive support and engaged challenge and who foster a healthy and inclusive corporate culture will outperform.
  • Vibrant board and corporate cultures are valuable assets, sources of competitive advantage and vital to the creation and protection of long-term value.
  • Board strength, composition and practices will be heavily scrutinized, including as to director expertise, average tenure, diversity, independence, character, and integrity.
  • Nuanced evaluations of the ongoing needs of the company, the expertise, experience and contributions of existing directors, and opportunities to strengthen the current composition will be integrated into proactive board development plans designed to enable the board’s composition and practices to evolve over time.
  • Failure to evolve the board and its practices in a measured way will expose companies to opportunistic activism and takeover bids.
  • Boards and management teams who know how to navigate stress, pressure, transition and crisis will thrive.

12. Capital Allocation.

  • Investors will have more heated debates among themselves and with companies about preferred capital allocation priorities, both at individual portfolio companies and at an industry level.
  • Companies will be more willing to reinvest in the business for growth, pursue smart and transformative M&A that fits within a longer-term plan to create value and make the case for investments that will take time to bear fruit by explaining their importance, timing and progress.
  • Prudently returning capital will remain a pillar of many value creation strategies but in a more balanced way and with more public discussion of tradeoffs between dividends versus share repurchases and alternative uses.
  • Investors may not agree with choices made by companies and will disagree with each other.

13. Directors as Investor Relation Officers.

  • While management will remain the primary spokesperson for the company, companies will better prepare for director-level interactions with major shareholders and become more sophisticated in knowing when and how to involve directors – proactively or upon appropriate request – without encroaching upon management effectiveness.
  • Directors will be deployed carefully but more frequently to help foster long-term relationships with key shareholders.
  • However, directors will need to be vigilant to ensure the company speaks with one voice and guard against attempts by investors to pursue inappropriate one-off engagements and foster mixed messages.

14. The General Counsel as Investor Relations Officer.

  • The general counsel (or its designee, such as the corporate secretary or other members of the legal staff) will play an increasingly central role in investor relations functions involving directors, senior management and the governance and proxy voting teams at actively managed and passive funds alike.
  • Board and management teams will look to the general counsel to advise on shareholder requests for meetings to discuss governance, the business portfolio, capital allocation and operating strategy, and the board’s practices and priorities and to evaluate whether given demands of corporate governance activists will improve governance or be counterproductive.

15. The Nature of Corporate Governance.

  • Questions about the basic purpose of corporations, how to define and measure corporate success, the weight given to stock prices as reflecting intrinsic value, and how to balance a wider range of stakeholder interests (including employees, customers, communities, and the economy and society as a whole) beyond the investor will become less esoteric and instead become central issues for concern and focus within corporate boardrooms and among policymakers and investors.
  • Measuring corporate governance by how many rights are afforded to a single class of stakeholder – the institutional investor – will be seen as misguided.
  • Corporate governance will increasingly be viewed as a framework for aligning boards, management teams, investors and stakeholders towards long-term value creation in ways that are more nuanced and less amenable to benchmarking and quantification.


The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and have not been endorsed, confirmed, or approved by XBMA or any of the editors of XBMA Forum, nor by XBMA’s founders, members, contributors, academic partners, advisory board members, or others. No inference to the contrary should be drawn.

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