Advisory Board

  • Cai Hongbin
  • Peking University Guanghua School of Management
  • Peter Clarke
  • Barry Diller
  • IAC/InterActiveCorp
  • Fu Chengyu
  • China National Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec Group)
  • Richard J. Gnodde
  • Goldman Sachs International
  • Lodewijk Hijmans van den Bergh
  • De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek N.V.
  • Jiang Jianqing
  • Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Ltd. (ICBC)
  • Handel Lee
  • King & Wood Mallesons
  • Richard Li
  • PCCW Limited
  • Pacific Century Group
  • Liew Mun Leong
  • Changi Airport Group
  • Martin Lipton
  • New York University
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
  • Liu Mingkang
  • China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)
  • Dinesh C. Paliwal
  • Harman International Industries
  • Leon Pasternak
  • BCC Partners
  • Tim Payne
  • Brunswick Group
  • Joseph R. Perella
  • Perella Weinberg Partners
  • Baron David de Rothschild
  • N M Rothschild & Sons Limited
  • Dilhan Pillay Sandrasegara
  • Temasek International Pte. Ltd.
  • Shao Ning
  • State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council of China (SASAC)
  • John W. Snow
  • Cerberus Capital Management, L.P.
  • Former U.S. Secretary of Treasury
  • Bharat Vasani
  • Tata Group
  • Wang Junfeng
  • King & Wood Mallesons
  • Wang Kejin
  • China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)
  • Wei Jiafu
  • Kazakhstan Potash Corporation Limited
  • Yang Chao
  • China Life Insurance Co. Ltd.
  • Zhu Min
  • International Monetary Fund

Legal Roundtable

  • Dimitry Afanasiev
  • Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev and Partners (Moscow)
  • William T. Allen
  • NYU Stern School of Business
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (New York)
  • Johan Aalto
  • Hannes Snellman Attorneys Ltd (Finland)
  • Nigel P. G. Boardman
  • Slaughter and May (London)
  • Willem J.L. Calkoen
  • NautaDutilh N.V. (Rotterdam)
  • Peter Callens
  • Loyens & Loeff (Brussels)
  • Bertrand Cardi
  • Darrois Villey Maillot & Brochier (Paris)
  • Santiago Carregal
  • Marval, O’Farrell & Mairal (Buenos Aires)
  • Martín Carrizosa
  • Philippi Prietocarrizosa & Uría (Bogotá)
  • Carlos G. Cordero G.
  • Aleman, Cordero, Galindo & Lee (Panama)
  • Ewen Crouch
  • Allens (Sydney)
  • Adam O. Emmerich
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (New York)
  • Rachel Eng
  • WongPartnership (Singapore)
  • Sergio Erede
  • BonelliErede (Milan)
  • Kenichi Fujinawa
  • Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu (Tokyo)
  • Manuel Galicia Romero
  • Galicia Abogados (Mexico City)
  • Danny Gilbert
  • Gilbert + Tobin (Sydney)
  • Vladimíra Glatzová
  • Glatzová & Co. (Prague)
  • Juan Miguel Goenechea
  • Uría Menéndez (Madrid)
  • Andrey A. Goltsblat
  • Goltsblat BLP (Moscow)
  • Juan Francisco Gutiérrez I.
  • Philippi Prietocarrizosa & Uría (Santiago)
  • Fang He
  • Jun He Law Offices (Beijing)
  • Christian Herbst
  • Schönherr (Vienna)
  • Lodewijk Hijmans van den Bergh
  • De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek N.V. (Amsterdam)
  • Hein Hooghoudt
  • NautaDutilh N.V. (Amsterdam)
  • Sameer Huda
  • Hadef & Partners (Dubai)
  • Masakazu Iwakura
  • TMI Associates (Tokyo)
  • Christof Jäckle
  • Hengeler Mueller (Frankfurt)
  • Michael Mervyn Katz
  • Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs (Johannesburg)
  • Handel Lee
  • King & Wood Mallesons (Beijing)
  • Martin Lipton
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (New York)
  • Alain Maillot
  • Darrois Villey Maillot Brochier (Paris)
  • Antônio Corrêa Meyer
  • Machado, Meyer, Sendacz e Opice (São Paulo)
  • Sergio Michelsen Jaramillo
  • Brigard & Urrutia (Bogotá)
  • Zia Mody
  • AZB & Partners (Mumbai)
  • Christopher Murray
  • Osler (Toronto)
  • Francisco Antunes Maciel Müssnich
  • Barbosa, Müssnich & Aragão (Rio de Janeiro)
  • I. Berl Nadler
  • Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP (Toronto)
  • Umberto Nicodano
  • BonelliErede (Milan)
  • Brian O'Gorman
  • Arthur Cox (Dublin)
  • Robin Panovka
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (New York)
  • Sang-Yeol Park
  • Park & Partners (Seoul)
  • José Antonio Payet Puccio
  • Payet Rey Cauvi (Lima)
  • Kees Peijster
  • COFRA Holding AG (Zug)
  • Juan Martín Perrotto
  • Uría & Menéndez (Madrid/Beijing)
  • Philip Podzebenko
  • Herbert Smith Freehills (Sydney)
  • Geert Potjewijd
  • De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek (Amsterdam/Beijing)
  • Qi Adam Li
  • Jun He Law Offices (Shanghai)
  • Biörn Riese
  • Jurie Advokat AB (Sweden)
  • Mark Rigotti
  • Herbert Smith Freehills (Sydney)
  • Rafael Robles Miaja
  • Robles Miaja (Mexico City)
  • Alberto Saravalle
  • BonelliErede (Milan)
  • Maximilian Schiessl
  • Hengeler Mueller (Düsseldorf)
  • Cyril S. Shroff
  • Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas (Mumbai)
  • Shardul S. Shroff
  • Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas & Co.(New Delhi)
  • Klaus Søgaard
  • Gorrissen Federspiel (Denmark)
  • Ezekiel Solomon
  • Allens (Sydney)
  • Emanuel P. Strehle
  • Hengeler Mueller (Munich)
  • David E. Tadmor
  • Tadmor & Co. (Tel Aviv)
  • Kevin J. Thomson
  • Barrick Gold Corporation (Toronto)
  • Yu Wakae
  • Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu (Tokyo)
  • Wang Junfeng
  • King & Wood Mallesons (Beijing)
  • Tomasz Wardynski
  • Wardynski & Partners (Warsaw)
  • Xiao Wei
  • Jun He Law Offices (Beijing)
  • Xu Ping
  • King & Wood Mallesons (Beijing)
  • Shuji Yanase
  • OK Corporation (Tokyo)
  • Alvin Yeo
  • WongPartnership LLP (Singapore)

Founding Directors

  • William T. Allen
  • NYU Stern School of Business
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
  • Nigel P.G. Boardman
  • Slaughter and May
  • Cai Hongbin
  • Peking University Guanghua School of Management
  • Adam O. Emmerich
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
  • Robin Panovka
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
  • Peter Williamson
  • Cambridge Judge Business School
  • Franny Yao
  • Ernst & Young

Monthly Archives: November 2018

DUTCH UPDATE – Shareholders’ Rights Directive implementation bill now before Parliament

Editor’s Note: Leo Groothuis advises clients on public M&A and on a wide variety of other domestic and cross-border transactions, as well as take-over defenses and shareholder activism. Geert Raaijmakers specializes in corporate governance, corporate structuring and joint ventures and on pension fund governance.  Maarten Buma and Suzanne Rutten specialize in corporate law. 

Shareholders’ Rights Directive implementation bill now before Parliament

On 16 October 2018, the bill for the implementation in Dutch law of the revised Shareholders’ Rights Directive (EU 2017/828) was submitted to the lower house of the Dutch parliament (Tweede Kamer). In this newsletter, we will describe the changes in the bill compared to the earlier consultation version published on 27 February 2018, which was the subject of our newsletter dated 9 March 2018.


The consultation version of the bill contained a new provision on the remuneration policy of listed companies. This gave rise to confusion, because the Dutch Civil Code (“DCC”) already contains a provision on the subject. Under the bill as submitted to Parliament, it has now been clarified that listed companies will be subject only to the new provision, which will become section 2:135a(5) DCC. This sets out the information that must be given in the company’s remuneration policy, some of which is already required. New items of information that will be required include:

  • an explanation of the way in which the policy contributes to the company’s business strategy, long-term interests and sustainability;
  • an explanation of the decision-making process followed for the policy’s determination, review and implementation; and
  • in the event that the policy is revised, a description and explanation of how it takes into account the votes and views of shareholders on the policy and remuneration reports since the most recent vote on the policy by the general meeting of shareholders.

In the case of the remuneration report it has likewise been clarified that listed companies will be subject only to the new section 2:135b DCC, which sets out a number of new requirements in addition to existing ones. It should be noted, however, that pursuant to section 2:135b the current requirements in sections 2:383c-e DCC will continue to apply. One of the new items of information that will be required is an explanation of how the total remuneration complies with the remuneration policy and how it contributes to the company’s long-term performance. All information must be given in respect of each individual management board member.


The bill introduces the term “material transactions” (unlike the consultation version, which referred to “significant transactions”) and sets out a definition in which price sensitivity is taken as the point of departure. A transaction will be material if it meets both of the following two criteria:

  1. the information about the transaction constitutes inside information under the Market Abuse Regulation (Regulation (EU) 596/2014); and
  2. the transaction is concluded between the company and a related party (as defined under the International Accounting Standards). Related parties in any event include:
    • one or more shareholders who individually or collectively represent at least 10% of the company’s issued share capital (“stichting administratiekantoor” foundations and foundations holding preference shares can fall within this category);
    • members of the company’s management board; and
    • members of the company’s supervisory board.

A provision has been added prohibiting a management board member or supervisory board member from participating in the decision making on a related party transaction in which that board member is involved. Lastly, the period over which non-material transactions with the same related party must be aggregated, potentially resulting in an obligation to disclose those transactions, has been changed from 12 months to “the same financial year”.


The definition of “asset manager” has been amended to clarify that it refers to those providing asset management services to institutional investors. The term “proxy advisor” has been replaced with “voting advisor” (stemadviseur), as this is more in line with the terminology commonly used in the Netherlands, including in the Dutch Corporate Governance Code. In addition the obligation on the part of institutional investors and asset managers to disclose and explain “the most significant votes”, and the possibility of excluding “insignificant votes” in this regard, have been elaborated upon.

The proposed reporting requirements overlap with those imposed under other EU directives and regulations, such as the AIFM, UCITS and MiFID II directives. The explanatory memorandum to the bill clarifies that it will be sufficient if asset managers include the relevant information in their other reports or include references to such information (for example using hyperlinks), provided it is made clear to the relevant institutional investors where the information can be found.


The deadline for the implementation of the Directive in national law is 10 June 2019. It is possible that the bill will be amended as it makes its way through Parliament. We will of course keep you updated on any significant amendments and on the entry into effect of the new legislation. It is also worth mentioning that both the government and the Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee are of the opinion that, in connection with the implementation of the Directive, the section of the Code relating to shareholders should be re-examined; we will likewise inform you of any developments on that front.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and have not been endorsed, confirmed, or approved by XBMA or any of the editors of XBMA Forum, nor by XBMA’s founders, members, contributors, academic partners, advisory board members, or others. No inference to the contrary should be drawn.

The Future of the Corporation

Editor’s Note: This article was authored by Martin Lipton of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.

November 7, 2018

The Future of the Corporation

A project of the British Academy—“The Future of the Corporation” reached a major milestone on November 1, 2018 with the public discussion of a framework and supporting papers.  The project is led by Oxford Prof. Colin Mayer.

In his framework, Prof. Mayer puts forth a radical reinterpretation of the nature of the corporation that focuses on the corporate purpose, its alignment with social purpose, the trustworthiness of companies and the role of corporate culture in promoting purpose and trust.  This view of the corporation rejects shareholder primacy—that the sole social purpose of the business corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth.

Instead, Prof. Mayer “puts forward an alternative approach that emphasizes the role of corporate purpose, commitments, trustworthiness and culture in which companies specify their purposes, clarify their associated commitments and demonstrate how their ownership, governance, performance measurement and management enable them to fulfil their obligations. Corporate and social purposes are aligned in companies and activities of particular social significance but not necessarily elsewhere.”

Prof. Mayer would implement his view of the corporation of the future by:

  • The starting point should be to recognize that the purpose of corporations is not simply to maximize shareholder value.
  • Corporations should specify their corporate purposes.
  • They should clarify the commitments that they make to the different parties to the firm associated with their purposes.
  • They should demonstrate how they can be trusted to uphold their commitments.
  • In particular they should record how their ownership, governance, performance measurements and incentives promote commitments to their purposes.

The ways in which corporations are encouraged to demonstrate commitment to purpose are in Prof. Mayer’s view:

  • Corporate law should require companies to specify their corporate purposes.
  • It should enable companies to adopt structures that are best suited to the delivery of their purposes.
  • It should require companies to demonstrate how their ownership, governance, performance measurements and incentives encourage them to commit to the delivery of their purposes.
  • It should require certain classes of companies that perform particular public and social functions, such as utilities, banks and companies with significant market power to align their corporate with their social purposes.
  • The regulatory system should promote an alignment of corporate with social purposes where required and ensure that companies’ ownership, governance, measurement and incentive systems are appropriate for this.

The foregoing and much more is set forth in a just-published, must-read book by Prof. Mayer, Prosperity.  The Mayer proposal for corporate governance and the policy changes that are necessary to develop it will return corporations to long-term sustainable investment, combine profitable operations with adherence to ESG and CSR principles, and sharply reduce short-termism and activist attacks.

Interestingly, on the same day as the British Academy program, the British Government agreed to amend the law to make it clear that pension plans have a fiduciary duty to protect long-term value by considering environmental risks of the companies in which they invest.  The British Government stated that the new rules “will push consideration of long-term value and environmental risks down the investment chain to investee firms.”

The objectives of the British Academy project parallel those of the World Economic Forum’s The New Paradigm:  A Roadmap for an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and Investors to Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth, the difference being the means by which they are achieved.  The latter by voluntary action by corporations and investors, the former by legislation.  Recent actions by the British Government and proposed legislation such as the Accountable Capitalism Act introduced in August 2018 by Senator Elizabeth Warren show that legislation impacting both corporations and investors is a distinct possibility.  The case for change is compelling.  One way or the other, Prof. Mayer’s concept of the corporation of the future will be achieved.

Martin Lipton

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and have not been endorsed, confirmed, or approved by XBMA or any of the editors of XBMA Forum, nor by XBMA’s founders, members, contributors, academic partners, advisory board members, or others. No inference to the contrary should be drawn.

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