Advisory Board

  • Cai Hongbin
  • Peking University Guanghua School of Management
  • Peter Clarke
  • Barry Diller
  • IAC/InterActiveCorp
  • Fu Chengyu
  • China National Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec Group)
  • Richard J. Gnodde
  • Goldman Sachs International
  • Lodewijk Hijmans van den Bergh
  • De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek N.V.
  • Jiang Jianqing
  • Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Ltd. (ICBC)
  • Handel Lee
  • King & Wood Mallesons
  • Richard Li
  • PCCW Limited
  • Pacific Century Group
  • Liew Mun Leong
  • Changi Airport Group
  • Martin Lipton
  • New York University
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
  • Liu Mingkang
  • China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)
  • Dinesh C. Paliwal
  • Harman International Industries
  • Leon Pasternak
  • BCC Partners
  • Tim Payne
  • Brunswick Group
  • Joseph R. Perella
  • Perella Weinberg Partners
  • Baron David de Rothschild
  • N M Rothschild & Sons Limited
  • Dilhan Pillay Sandrasegara
  • Temasek International Pte. Ltd.
  • Shao Ning
  • State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council of China (SASAC)
  • John W. Snow
  • Cerberus Capital Management, L.P.
  • Former U.S. Secretary of Treasury
  • Bharat Vasani
  • Tata Group
  • Wang Junfeng
  • King & Wood Mallesons
  • Wang Kejin
  • China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)
  • Wei Jiafu
  • Kazakhstan Potash Corporation Limited
  • Yang Chao
  • China Life Insurance Co. Ltd.
  • Zhu Min
  • International Monetary Fund

Legal Roundtable

  • Dimitry Afanasiev
  • Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev and Partners (Moscow)
  • William T. Allen
  • NYU Stern School of Business
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (New York)
  • Johan Aalto
  • Hannes Snellman Attorneys Ltd (Finland)
  • Nigel P. G. Boardman
  • Slaughter and May (London)
  • Willem J.L. Calkoen
  • NautaDutilh N.V. (Rotterdam)
  • Peter Callens
  • Loyens & Loeff (Brussels)
  • Bertrand Cardi
  • Darrois Villey Maillot & Brochier (Paris)
  • Santiago Carregal
  • Marval, O’Farrell & Mairal (Buenos Aires)
  • Martín Carrizosa
  • Philippi Prietocarrizosa & Uría (Bogotá)
  • Carlos G. Cordero G.
  • Aleman, Cordero, Galindo & Lee (Panama)
  • Ewen Crouch
  • Allens (Sydney)
  • Adam O. Emmerich
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (New York)
  • Rachel Eng
  • WongPartnership (Singapore)
  • Sergio Erede
  • BonelliErede (Milan)
  • Kenichi Fujinawa
  • Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu (Tokyo)
  • Manuel Galicia Romero
  • Galicia Abogados (Mexico City)
  • Danny Gilbert
  • Gilbert + Tobin (Sydney)
  • Vladimíra Glatzová
  • Glatzová & Co. (Prague)
  • Juan Miguel Goenechea
  • Uría Menéndez (Madrid)
  • Andrey A. Goltsblat
  • Goltsblat BLP (Moscow)
  • Juan Francisco Gutiérrez I.
  • Philippi Prietocarrizosa & Uría (Santiago)
  • Fang He
  • Jun He Law Offices (Beijing)
  • Christian Herbst
  • Schönherr (Vienna)
  • Lodewijk Hijmans van den Bergh
  • De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek N.V. (Amsterdam)
  • Hein Hooghoudt
  • NautaDutilh N.V. (Amsterdam)
  • Sameer Huda
  • Hadef & Partners (Dubai)
  • Masakazu Iwakura
  • TMI Associates (Tokyo)
  • Christof Jäckle
  • Hengeler Mueller (Frankfurt)
  • Michael Mervyn Katz
  • Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs (Johannesburg)
  • Handel Lee
  • King & Wood Mallesons (Beijing)
  • Martin Lipton
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (New York)
  • Alain Maillot
  • Darrois Villey Maillot Brochier (Paris)
  • Antônio Corrêa Meyer
  • Machado, Meyer, Sendacz e Opice (São Paulo)
  • Sergio Michelsen Jaramillo
  • Brigard & Urrutia (Bogotá)
  • Zia Mody
  • AZB & Partners (Mumbai)
  • Christopher Murray
  • Osler (Toronto)
  • Francisco Antunes Maciel Müssnich
  • Barbosa, Müssnich & Aragão (Rio de Janeiro)
  • I. Berl Nadler
  • Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP (Toronto)
  • Umberto Nicodano
  • BonelliErede (Milan)
  • Brian O'Gorman
  • Arthur Cox (Dublin)
  • Robin Panovka
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (New York)
  • Sang-Yeol Park
  • Park & Partners (Seoul)
  • José Antonio Payet Puccio
  • Payet Rey Cauvi (Lima)
  • Kees Peijster
  • COFRA Holding AG (Zug)
  • Juan Martín Perrotto
  • Uría & Menéndez (Madrid/Beijing)
  • Philip Podzebenko
  • Herbert Smith Freehills (Sydney)
  • Geert Potjewijd
  • De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek (Amsterdam/Beijing)
  • Qi Adam Li
  • Jun He Law Offices (Shanghai)
  • Biörn Riese
  • Jurie Advokat AB (Sweden)
  • Mark Rigotti
  • Herbert Smith Freehills (Sydney)
  • Rafael Robles Miaja
  • Robles Miaja (Mexico City)
  • Alberto Saravalle
  • BonelliErede (Milan)
  • Maximilian Schiessl
  • Hengeler Mueller (Düsseldorf)
  • Cyril S. Shroff
  • Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas (Mumbai)
  • Shardul S. Shroff
  • Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas & Co.(New Delhi)
  • Klaus Søgaard
  • Gorrissen Federspiel (Denmark)
  • Ezekiel Solomon
  • Allens (Sydney)
  • Emanuel P. Strehle
  • Hengeler Mueller (Munich)
  • David E. Tadmor
  • Tadmor & Co. (Tel Aviv)
  • Kevin J. Thomson
  • Barrick Gold Corporation (Toronto)
  • Yu Wakae
  • Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu (Tokyo)
  • Wang Junfeng
  • King & Wood Mallesons (Beijing)
  • Tomasz Wardynski
  • Wardynski & Partners (Warsaw)
  • Rolf Watter
  • Bär & Karrer AG (Zürich)
  • Xiao Wei
  • Jun He Law Offices (Beijing)
  • Xu Ping
  • King & Wood Mallesons (Beijing)
  • Shuji Yanase
  • OK Corporation (Tokyo)
  • Alvin Yeo
  • WongPartnership LLP (Singapore)

Founding Directors

  • William T. Allen
  • NYU Stern School of Business
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
  • Nigel P.G. Boardman
  • Slaughter and May
  • Cai Hongbin
  • Peking University Guanghua School of Management
  • Adam O. Emmerich
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
  • Robin Panovka
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
  • Peter Williamson
  • Cambridge Judge Business School
  • Franny Yao
  • Ernst & Young

M&A (General)

AUSTRIA UPDATE – Legislative Changes Affecting Private and Public M&A – New Delisting Rules

Editors’ Note: Christian Herbst is a partner of Schönherr and a member of XBMA’s Legal Roundtable. He is one of the leading Austrian specialists in cross-border M&A, takeovers and joint ventures, representing mostly foreign clients with respect to investments in Austria and Central Eastern Europe.

Executive Summary: Recent legislative measures affecting private and public M&A include: Effective November 2017, the scope of the Austrian merger control regime will be broadened. Effective January 3, 2018, public M&A will be affected by a change in takeover procedures as well as new delisting rules allowing voluntary de-listings from the Vienna Stock Exchange in connection with public offers or re-listings at other EU Stock Exchanges. Additionally, in implementing the Fourth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive, the establishment of a Beneficial Ownership Register will require companies to notify the Register of their ultimate beneficial owners during H1 2018.

Scope of Austrian merger control regime broadened 

For transactions which are implemented on or after 1 November 2017, an entirely new additional notification threshold will apply in the Austrian merger control regime. The new threshold is built on a combination of turnover, transaction value and the target being active in Austria and will in particular capture foreign companies which are active on the Austrian market from abroad, in particular online companies: 

For merger control purposes a notifiable concentration will now also apply, if cumulatively the combined worldwide turnover of the undertakings concerned exceeds EUR 300m, the combined Austrian turnover exceeds EUR 15m, the value of the concentration (purchase price plus liabilities taken over) exceeds EUR 200m and the target undertaking has significant activity in Austria (e.g. site in Austria or in the digital context, e.g. monthly active users with Austrian nexus). 

Minimum acceptance period for public offers extended

Under a 2017 Amendment Act to the Austrian Takeover Act, effective 3 January 2018, the following will apply. 

The minimum acceptance period which a bidder must allow in a public offer will be increased from two weeks to four weeks. The maximum initial offer period, however, will stay at ten weeks. Also, no change applies to the statutory 3 months additional offer period following the expiration of the initial offer period of a public offer.

The reason for the change of the minimum offer period to four weeks is to allow the target board a more reasonable period to react to public offers, including calling a shareholders meeting seeking shareholder approval for defensive measures. 

New voluntary delisting rules as of 3 January 2018 

Currently, Austrian law only allows a delisting of listed companies by squeeze out of minorities once a shareholder reaches a 90 percent participation threshold in a target. As of 2018, an additional voluntary delisting regime will apply in addition to the delisting by squeeze out.

Delisting by Squeeze Out: 

Listing stops if the listing requirements are no longer met. One key requirement is that at least 10,000 shares or a nominal value of EUR 750,000 must be held by the public (free float) (Section 66(7), Stock Exchange Act). 

A bidder can de-list a target by acquiring target shares by public offer or on or off market purchases so that fewer than 10,000 of them are held by the public and then initiate the squeeze out of the minorities under the Shareholder Exclusion Act. Upon completion of the squeeze out, the target company is delisted. 

Delisting under the voluntary delisting scheme of the Stock Exchange Act and Takeover Act: 

August 2017 amendments of the Stock Exchange Act, Stock Corporation Act and Takeover Act will allow for a voluntary delisting from the Vienna Stock Exchange as of 3 January 2018. The Takeover Act will provide new rules for public offers to achieve a voluntary delisting under Section 38 (new as amended) Austrian Stock Exchange Act in connection with or unrelated to a corporate restructuring like change of legal form, split or demerger. Takeover offers in this context will be subject to additional minimum pricing rules. 

Under the new rules, a withdrawal of the listing at the VSE may be requested provided that (i) the financial instruments have been listed for a minimum of three years and (ii) adequate investor protection is secured. 

A delisting complying with adequate investor protection requires the following: First, a resolution of the shareholders meeting of the listed company with a 75% majority or a notarized joint request by stockholders controlling at least 75% of the voting capital of the listed company must be secured. Subsequently, a full public offer aimed at a delisting and supervised by the Austrian Takeover Commission needs to be launched. Such full public offer can be launched independently from or in the context of a corporate reorganization, such as a change of the statutes including change of legal form, merger, transformation or split of the target company. 

In case of an offer aimed at a delisting, the following minimum pricing rules must be complied with: The price offered in a public takeover launched to delist must not be lower than (i) the weighted average price of the last six month, (ii) the highest price agreed or paid for target shares by the bidder or parties acting in concert with the bidder, in the 12 months before notification of the offer and (iii) the average price of the last 5 trading days before announcement of the intention to launch a delisting offer. If that price is apparently below the actual (market) value of the target company, an adequate offer price (based on a company valuation) must be fixed by the Austrian Takeover Commission. 

No public offer is required for a delisting from the VSE in case the target company relists or stays listed (in case of a dual listing) at an EEA Exchange providing similar protection measures as the VSE; a case in point is the RHI/Magnesita merger as resolved in August 2017 where RHI will be delisted from the VSE and relisted in London.   

Beneficial Ownership Disclosure 

The Beneficial Ownership Register will implement the Fourth EU Anti Money Laundering Directive and require Austrian companies to take reasonable measures to determine the identity and subsequently notify the Register of defined beneficial owners by 1 June 2018 at the latest. The beneficial ownership test includes (i) a natural person holding directly more than 25% of the shares in an Austrian company; and/or (ii) more than 25% of the shares in an Austrian company are held by another legal entity which is directly or indirectly controlled by a natural person; control in this respect is indicated by directly or indirectly holding 50% of the shares; and/or (iii) a natural person directly or indirectly holding more than 25% of the voting rights of the Austrian company. 

The purpose of the new law is for all EU countries to store beneficial ownership information to combat money laundering and terrorism but also to allow governmental authorities and defined others to conduct customer due diligence.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and have not been endorsed, confirmed, or approved by XBMA or any of the editors of XBMA Forum, nor by XBMA’s founders, members, contributors, academic partners, advisory board members, or others. No inference to the contrary should be drawn.

UK UPDATE – A New Takeover Panel Consultation

Editors’ Note: Contributed by Nigel Boardman, a partner at Slaughter and May and a founding director of XBMA.  Mr. Boardman is one of the leading M&A lawyers in the UK with broad experience in a wide range of cross-border transactions.

The Panel has today (19 September 2017) published its consultation paper PCP 2017/2 on statements of intention. The Panel has been concerned for some time that the disclosures by a bidder in relation to its intentions for the target business (required to be made in the offer document) have been bland and generic, and therefore do not really provide the target board and other stakeholders (particularly employees and pension scheme trustees) with sufficient specific information to make a meaningful assessment of the bid. This is an area of the Code that has now been consulted on a number of times, firstly following Kraft’s takeover of Cadbury, and subsequently following Pfizer’s possible bid for AstraZeneca (which did not proceed).  The consultation paper sets out certain proposals to address this issue and other related matters.

In summary, the proposals would, if implemented: 

widen the scope of “social/employment disclosures” by bidders from the current regime (impact on employees and places of business)

In particular, the Panel is requiring specific disclosures to cover:

o   the impact on the target’s R&D function

o   the “balance of skills and functions of [the target’s] employees and management”

o   location of the target’s HQ and HQ functions

The changes are presumably intended to make generic disclosures harder. Notably, the Panel has expressed the view that statements of intention should not be qualified by reference to a bidder’s “current” or “present” intentions.

require that the same “social disclosures” regarding the target business, employees and location be made at an earlier point in the offer timetable

This would be at the time of the Rule 2.7 firm offer announcement rather than just in the offer document. This front-loads the disclosures so that a bidder must disclose intentions for the target business by the time it makes the announcement of its actual offer (i.e. up to a 28 days’ acceleration of the information).

prohibit the bidder from publishing the offer document within 14 days of the Rule 2.7 announcement except with the consent of the target

The main impact of this proposal is on hostile offers since the bidder cannot launch a hostile offer and immediately publish the offer document. Currently a target has 14 days after publication of the offer document to publish its defence document. Further, in a situation where the target may need accountants and other advisers to produce profit forecasts and other reports to mount a proper defence, it was thought that the current 14 day period puts too much pressure on the target. This new requirement gives the target at least 28 days to respond to a hostile offer.

In a recommended offer, the target is normally involved in the production of the (combined) offer document and can, of course, consent to earlier publication.

impose additional requirements on the party which has made any post-offer undertakings or post-offer intention statements

This would require that party:

o   in relation to any post-offer undertakings, to publish the reports that it is currently required to submit to the Panel in relation to its compliance with those undertakings. Currently publication is only required at the Panel’s discretion. The reports must be produced and published at least on an annual basis (where the undertaking is for a period longer than a year)

o   in relation to post-offer intention statements, to confirm in writing to the Panel whether it has taken, or not taken the course of action described in the statement at the end of the 12 months following the end of the offer period (or such other period specified in the statement) and the confirmation must be published/announced via an RIS. Current practice only requires a private confirmation to be made to the Panel at the end of the period.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and have not been endorsed, confirmed, or approved by XBMA or any of the editors of XBMA Forum, nor by XBMA’s founders, members, contributors, academic partners, advisory board members, or others. No inference to the contrary should be drawn.

U.S. / U.K. UPDATE: Corporate Governance — the New Paradigm

Editor’s Note: This article was authored by Martin Lipton and Sabastian V. Niles of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.

Main Article:

This week witnessed two very significant developments in the new paradigm for corporate governance, one in the U.S. and one in the U.K. Both will have cross-border impact. Both have the purpose of promoting investment to achieve sustainable long-term investment and growth.

In the U.K., government proposals for corporate governance reform center on (1) better aligning executive pay with performance and with explaining, if not actually improving, worker wages by publicizing and focusing the attention of corporate directors on the ratio of average worker wages to executive compensation, and (2) improving governance by emphasizing that Section 172 of the Company Law, a constituency statute, provides that directors owe fiduciary duties not just to shareholders, but to customers, suppliers, workers and the community and economy. There is a provision for worker-board engagement by a designated independent director, a formal worker advisory council or a director from the workforce. The report directly relates improving stakeholder governance to mitigating inequality in the U.K. society.

In the U.S., Vanguard sent a letter to the boards and CEOs of all of the corporations in the Vanguard portfolios worldwide setting forth its views on governance, engagement and stewardship. It also issued its 2017 investment stewardship report. The report sets forth Vanguard’s policy for dealing with activist pressure and contains illustrations of how Vanguard dealt with several actual activist campaigns. (See our memo on the Vanguard letter.)

The U.K. government report and the Vanguard letter and report, together with the effort by the World Economic Forum to promote acceptance of The New Paradigm: A Roadmap for an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and Investors to Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth issued last year by its International Business Council, gives hope that they will spark additional efforts that together will alleviate the pressure, by asset managers for short-term performance and by activist hedge funds for quick gains from financial engineering, against long-term investment in R&D; capex and reinvestment in the business; building strong employee relations, employment stability and employee training; and sustainability and good corporate citizenship.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and have not been endorsed, confirmed, or approved by XBMA or any of the editors of XBMA Forum, nor by XBMA’s founders, members, contributors, academic partners, advisory board members, or others. No inference to the contrary should be drawn.

GLOBAL STATISTICAL UPDATE – XBMA Quarterly Review for Second Quarter 2017

Editors’ Note: The XBMA Review is published on a quarterly basis in order to facilitate a deeper understanding of trends and developments. In order to facilitate meaningful comparisons, the Review has utilized generally consistent metrics and sources of data since inception. We welcome feedback and suggestions for improving the XBMA Review or for interpreting the data.

Executive Summary/Highlights:

  • Global M&A volume in Q2 was ~US$823 billion, ~6% higher than Q1.
  • European M&A continued its strong trend in Q2, accounting for ~30% of deal volume, up substantially from prior years.
  • Aggregate inbound M&A volume into all BRIC countries reached nearly US$33 billion, marking the strongest Q2 in recent years, contributing to the strongest H1 in recent years, and more than doubling from H1 2016.
  • The Real Estate sector had the strongest Q2, with US$131 billion in total deal volume, posting its strongest quarter of the last four quarters, and jumping 90% relative to Q1.
  • The Industrials sector accounted for the most cross-border M&A volume in Q2, at almost US$75 billion and accounting for nearly 25% of all cross-border deal activity in Q2.

Click here to see the Review.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and have not been endorsed, confirmed, or approved by XBMA or any of the editors of XBMA Forum, nor by XBMA’s founders, members, contributors, academic partners, advisory board members, or others. No inference to the contrary should be drawn.

EUROPEAN UPDATE – Guide to Public Takeovers in Europe 2016-2017

Editors’ Note: This guide summarises the main characteristics of the French, Dutch, German, Italian, Spanish and UK laws and regulations applying to public takeover offers as they stood at June 2016.

Executive Summary: The guide has been updated to reflect legal and regulatory changes made to the national takeover regimes since it was last published in April 2013. The Takeover Directive has been implemented in all of the countries which are covered. Its aim is to provide equivalent protection throughout the EU for minority shareholders of companies listed on an EU regulated stock exchange in the event of a change of control, and to provide for minimum guidelines on the conduct of takeover bids.

However, the Takeover Directive makes some of its provisions – relating to defensive measures and voting rights/restrictions – optional, which means that, even after implementation, different regimes exist in different countries.

Against this background, the intention is that this guide will not only be of practical use for users, but also that an understanding of how particular jurisdictions have changed their legal/regulatory systems and practices will be of additional help to users of this guide in understanding the ongoing implications of the Takeover Directive.

Click here to read the full report.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and have not been endorsed, confirmed, or approved by XBMA or any of the editors of XBMA Forum, nor by XBMA’s founders, members, contributors, academic partners, advisory board members, or others. No inference to the contrary should be drawn.

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