Advisory Board

  • Cai Hongbin
  • Peking University Guanghua School of Management
  • Peter Clarke
  • Barry Diller
  • IAC/InterActiveCorp
  • Fu Chengyu
  • China National Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec Group)
  • Richard J. Gnodde
  • Goldman Sachs International
  • Lodewijk Hijmans van den Bergh
  • De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek N.V.
  • Jiang Jianqing
  • Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Ltd. (ICBC)
  • Handel Lee
  • King & Wood Mallesons
  • Richard Li
  • PCCW Limited
  • Pacific Century Group
  • Liew Mun Leong
  • Changi Airport Group
  • Martin Lipton
  • New York University
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
  • Liu Mingkang
  • China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)
  • Dinesh C. Paliwal
  • Harman International Industries
  • Leon Pasternak
  • BCC Partners
  • Tim Payne
  • Brunswick Group
  • Joseph R. Perella
  • Perella Weinberg Partners
  • Baron David de Rothschild
  • N M Rothschild & Sons Limited
  • Dilhan Pillay Sandrasegara
  • Temasek International Pte. Ltd.
  • Shao Ning
  • State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council of China (SASAC)
  • John W. Snow
  • Cerberus Capital Management, L.P.
  • Former U.S. Secretary of Treasury
  • Bharat Vasani
  • Tata Group
  • Wang Junfeng
  • King & Wood Mallesons
  • Wang Kejin
  • China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)
  • Wei Jiafu
  • Kazakhstan Potash Corporation Limited
  • Yang Chao
  • China Life Insurance Co. Ltd.
  • Zhu Min
  • International Monetary Fund

Legal Roundtable

  • Dimitry Afanasiev
  • Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev and Partners (Moscow)
  • William T. Allen
  • NYU Stern School of Business
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (New York)
  • Johan Aalto
  • Hannes Snellman Attorneys Ltd (Finland)
  • Nigel P. G. Boardman
  • Slaughter and May (London)
  • Willem J.L. Calkoen
  • NautaDutilh N.V. (Rotterdam)
  • Peter Callens
  • Loyens & Loeff (Brussels)
  • Bertrand Cardi
  • Darrois Villey Maillot & Brochier (Paris)
  • Santiago Carregal
  • Marval, O’Farrell & Mairal (Buenos Aires)
  • Martín Carrizosa
  • Philippi Prietocarrizosa & Uría (Bogotá)
  • Carlos G. Cordero G.
  • Aleman, Cordero, Galindo & Lee (Panama)
  • Ewen Crouch
  • Allens (Sydney)
  • Adam O. Emmerich
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (New York)
  • Rachel Eng
  • WongPartnership (Singapore)
  • Sergio Erede
  • BonelliErede (Milan)
  • Kenichi Fujinawa
  • Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu (Tokyo)
  • Manuel Galicia Romero
  • Galicia Abogados (Mexico City)
  • Danny Gilbert
  • Gilbert + Tobin (Sydney)
  • Vladimíra Glatzová
  • Glatzová & Co. (Prague)
  • Juan Miguel Goenechea
  • Uría Menéndez (Madrid)
  • Andrey A. Goltsblat
  • Goltsblat BLP (Moscow)
  • Juan Francisco Gutiérrez I.
  • Philippi Prietocarrizosa & Uría (Santiago)
  • Fang He
  • Jun He Law Offices (Beijing)
  • Christian Herbst
  • Schönherr (Vienna)
  • Lodewijk Hijmans van den Bergh
  • De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek N.V. (Amsterdam)
  • Hein Hooghoudt
  • NautaDutilh N.V. (Amsterdam)
  • Sameer Huda
  • Hadef & Partners (Dubai)
  • Masakazu Iwakura
  • TMI Associates (Tokyo)
  • Christof Jäckle
  • Hengeler Mueller (Frankfurt)
  • Michael Mervyn Katz
  • Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs (Johannesburg)
  • Handel Lee
  • King & Wood Mallesons (Beijing)
  • Martin Lipton
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (New York)
  • Alain Maillot
  • Darrois Villey Maillot Brochier (Paris)
  • Antônio Corrêa Meyer
  • Machado, Meyer, Sendacz e Opice (São Paulo)
  • Sergio Michelsen Jaramillo
  • Brigard & Urrutia (Bogotá)
  • Zia Mody
  • AZB & Partners (Mumbai)
  • Christopher Murray
  • Osler (Toronto)
  • Francisco Antunes Maciel Müssnich
  • Barbosa, Müssnich & Aragão (Rio de Janeiro)
  • I. Berl Nadler
  • Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP (Toronto)
  • Umberto Nicodano
  • BonelliErede (Milan)
  • Brian O'Gorman
  • Arthur Cox (Dublin)
  • Robin Panovka
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (New York)
  • Sang-Yeol Park
  • Park & Partners (Seoul)
  • José Antonio Payet Puccio
  • Payet Rey Cauvi (Lima)
  • Kees Peijster
  • COFRA Holding AG (Zug)
  • Juan Martín Perrotto
  • Uría & Menéndez (Madrid/Beijing)
  • Philip Podzebenko
  • Herbert Smith Freehills (Sydney)
  • Geert Potjewijd
  • De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek (Amsterdam/Beijing)
  • Qi Adam Li
  • Jun He Law Offices (Shanghai)
  • Biörn Riese
  • Jurie Advokat AB (Sweden)
  • Mark Rigotti
  • Herbert Smith Freehills (Sydney)
  • Rafael Robles Miaja
  • Robles Miaja (Mexico City)
  • Alberto Saravalle
  • BonelliErede (Milan)
  • Maximilian Schiessl
  • Hengeler Mueller (Düsseldorf)
  • Cyril S. Shroff
  • Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas (Mumbai)
  • Shardul S. Shroff
  • Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas & Co.(New Delhi)
  • Klaus Søgaard
  • Gorrissen Federspiel (Denmark)
  • Ezekiel Solomon
  • Allens (Sydney)
  • Emanuel P. Strehle
  • Hengeler Mueller (Munich)
  • David E. Tadmor
  • Tadmor & Co. (Tel Aviv)
  • Kevin J. Thomson
  • Barrick Gold Corporation (Toronto)
  • Yu Wakae
  • Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu (Tokyo)
  • Wang Junfeng
  • King & Wood Mallesons (Beijing)
  • Tomasz Wardynski
  • Wardynski & Partners (Warsaw)
  • Xiao Wei
  • Jun He Law Offices (Beijing)
  • Xu Ping
  • King & Wood Mallesons (Beijing)
  • Shuji Yanase
  • OK Corporation (Tokyo)
  • Alvin Yeo
  • WongPartnership LLP (Singapore)

Founding Directors

  • William T. Allen
  • NYU Stern School of Business
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
  • Nigel P.G. Boardman
  • Slaughter and May
  • Cai Hongbin
  • Peking University Guanghua School of Management
  • Adam O. Emmerich
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
  • Robin Panovka
  • Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
  • Peter Williamson
  • Cambridge Judge Business School
  • Franny Yao
  • Ernst & Young


SWEDISH UPDATE – Proposed Revised Swedish Takeover Rules

Editors’ Note: This paper was contributed by Biörn Riese, Chairman of the Board of Mannheimer Swartling and member of XBMA´s Legal Roundtable.  It was authored by Thomas Wallinder and Patrik Marcelius, partners at Mannheimer Swartling.  Messrs. Wallinder and Marcelius both specialise in Corporate law, with a particular emphasis on corporate finance, takeovers and mergers & acquisitions.


  • A review of the Swedish Takeover Rules has resulted in a proposal to amend and update the Rules in a number of respects including, deal protection, top ups, and the put up or shut up regime.
  • The revision has also resulted in the codification of a number of Securities Council statements including disclosure of holdings of long equity derivatives.


The Swedish Corporate Governance Board has published a proposal for revised takeover rules. It is expected that the revised rules will be adopted by the two stock exchanges, NASDAQ OMX Stockholm AB and Nordic Growth Market NGM AB, and enter into force on 1 July 2012. This article summarizes certain proposed key changes.


Under the revised rules the target board may not enter into any deal protection arrangements, such as no-shop provisions and inducement fees, unless the target board determines in each case that there are “special reasons” that justify such arrangements. This modification is intended to express a restrictive approach to deal protection measures.


The revised rules clarify that pre-offer acquisitions where the bidder agrees to compensate a seller of target shares for any difference between the sale price and the ultimate bid price are permitted.


The revised rules clarify that the bidder is not required to extend the acceptance period if the bid becomes subject to a “Phase II” investigation by a competition authority.


The current rules provide that if the bidder has made a leak announcement of a possible offer, the Securities Council may impose a deadline by which an offer must be made and, unless a bid is made by that deadline, impose restrictions to prevent the bidder from making an offer for the relevant target during a certain period. The revised rules clarify that the Securities Council has the authority to impose a deadline by which a bid must be made also where no leak announcement by the bidder has been made, if the target would otherwise be hindered in the conduct of its affairs for longer than is reasonable.


A public offer must generally be made for all warrants and convertible debt instruments in the target at a “fair“ price. It has become common practice for bidders to ask the Securities Council for a dispensation not to make an offer for such securities if they have been issued under an employee incentive scheme. Such dispensations are normally subject to a condition that the holders of such securities receive “fair” treatment by the bidder outside the offer. The revised rules codify this practice by introducing a blanket exemption from the requirement to make a public offer for securities that have been issued under an employee incentive scheme, provided that the bidder ensures that the holders of such securities are treated fairly outside the offer.


The current rules provide that if a bid is withdrawn, the bidder and its concert parties cannot (except in accordance with a waiver from the Securities Council), within 12 months of the expiry of the acceptance period, make another bid for the same target or acquire a stake in the target that would require the bidder to make a mandatory bid. The revised rules clarify that this requirement does not apply where the bidder announces a recommended bid during the 12-month period.


The revised rules provide that if the bid has been made subject to the approval of the general meeting of the bidder or the target, reliance on such condition requires that the non-satisfaction of the condition is of material importance to the bidder’s acquisition of the target. The practical impact of this modification should be limited since this type of condition is normally only relevant in exchange offers and the non-satisfaction of such condition in exchange offers would generally satisfy the materiality test.


Under the current rules a bidder may not generally set aside a “no-extension statement”. The revised rules clarify that the Securities Council has the authority to determine also in other cases whether parties involved in a takeover may set aside firm statements of intention, such as statements by a bidder that the bid will not be “increased” or “revised”.


Under the revised rules the target board should generally not announce new information of “importance to the assessment of the bid” later than two weeks prior to the expiry of the acceptance period, other than in accordance with its continuing disclosure obligations.


The revised rules include a number of modifications intended to codify certain Securities Council statements, including the following.

  • Any incentive scheme offered by the bidder to target employees will need to be approved by the target board and be disclosed in the offer documentation.
  • A bidder is required to disclose its holdings of long equity derivatives in the offer documentation, even if such derivatives are cash-settled.
  • A bidder is not required to make a “fair” offer for warrants issued by the target if the value of the warrants (generally including their time value) is negligible, whereas such offer is generally required to be made for convertible debt instruments even if the value of the conversion right is negligible.
The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and have not been endorsed, confirmed, or approved by XBMA or any of the editors of XBMA Forum, nor by XBMA’s founders, members, contributors, academic partners, advisory board members, or others. No inference to the contrary should be drawn.

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